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INSTITUTIONAL WASTE WITHIN THE 
CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY: AN OUTLINE 
  Saad Sarhan1, Christine Pasquire2 and Andrew King3 
ABSTRACT  
Waste, as understood in Lean thinking, does not feature in modern construction 
economics or management theory. These approaches fail to recognise the imperfect 
systems in which entities not only operate inefficiently, but additionally protect 
themselves by adding contingency and behaving opportunistically. The effect of these 
practices is to embed inefficient and wasteful processes across the supply chain and 
throughout the project life cycle. Consequently they have become part of the 
institution of the construction industry – ‘the way it does business’.   
The aim of this paper is to contribute to the understanding of waste in construction 
and shed light on a number of regulations, norms and routines, which are taken for 
granted and impede efficiency and improvement efforts in construction. It starts by 
critically discussing a number of imperfect systems and structures that support 
wasteful activities in construction. Next, the background of the institutional theory is 
introduced, which interestingly is not well established in construction management 
literature. We then demonstrate how the neo-institutional theory, a branch of 
organizational sociology, has the potential to be used as an analytical lens to deliver a 
more explicit theory of waste relating cause and effect within the wider aspects of 
construction systems and relationships.  Finally, an outline of the concept of 
‘institutional waste in construction’ is defined, and five tentative guiding hypotheses 
are specified for future empirical examination. 
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INTRODUCTION 
It is widely accepted that there is considerable waste in the end-to-end design, 
construction and facility management process. Empirical evidence points to waste in 
excess of 50% of construction time (see Figure 1) where waste is defined as anything 
that is not required to create value for the customer/client or end-user. This is 
primarily process waste with some physical waste.  
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Figure 1: Analysis and examples of waste in construction. Proportions based on 
studies by Diekmann et al. (2004) in the US and unpublished studies in the UK by 
Cameron Orr, AWD and Construction excellence as cited by Mossman (2009). 
Diagram adopted and modified from Mossman (2009)  
The fact that much of this waste is common to many projects leads to the study’s 
hypothesis: that there are institutional systems, structural arrangements and cognitive 
framework assumptions that support and encourage wasteful activities in 
construction. Institutions are commonly defined as ‘the rules of the game’ (North, 
1994; Peng et al., 2009).  Therefore, the aim of this paper is to contribute to the 
overall understanding of waste in construction and to shed light on a number of taken 
for granted regulations, norms and meanings that impede efficiency and improvement 
efforts in construction. 
THE CONCEPT OF WASTE IN CONSTRUCTION LITERATURE 
The Construction industry, according to researchers, is seen as a slowly progressing 
industry with numerous problems. Over the past 60 years the industry has 
commissioned several reports with the aim of reviewing its performance and 
suggesting means of improvement. Of these, the Egan report, ‘Rethinking 
Construction’, was produced in 1998 to address concerns raised by clients engaging 
services of construction companies; and was followed by the ‘Never Waste A Good 
Crisis’ report published by construction excellence in 2009 to review the subsequent 
progress.  The former report sent a clear message to the construction industry by 
stressing that: 
“Recent studies in the USA, Scandinavia and this country suggest that up to 30% of 
construction is rework, labor is used at only 40-60% of potential efficiency, accidents 
can account for 3-6% of total project costs, and at least 10% of materials are 
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wasted…The message is clear - there is plenty of scope for improving efficiency and 
quality simply by taking waste out of construction” (Egan, 1998, p.15). 
There are many general classifications of process waste as defined in lean 
thinking. For example, they include Tachii Ohno’s seven wastes: transportation, 
inventory, motion, waiting, over-production, over-processing, and defects (Ohno 
1988, pp. 19-20). In addition, the waste of human potential - e.g. ‘Not speaking, not 
listening’ by Macomber & Howel (2004), and the ‘Making-do’ waste presented by 
Koskela (2004) is included within this category. Koskela et al (2013) propose that the 
making do waste is the lead waste in construction. A systematic literature review on 
empirical studies of waste-minimisation in construction by Viana et al (2012) found 
that research is focused on addressing three different categories of waste:  
1. Construction material waste (physical waste);  
2. Non value-adding activities (process waste); 
3. Specific sorts of waste (such as accidents and rework). 
An analysis of the literature on waste in construction reveals that the concept has not 
been prevalent in the field of construction economics or management (Koskela and 
Ballard, 2012). Research efforts aimed at understanding waste are relatively limited 
when compared to other topics in construction, and many waste-related studies have 
focused on the causes; not on the root causes. Most of the contributions to the 
investigation of process waste and non-value adding activities are produced by 
members from the lean construction community (Viana et al., 2012). There is no 
doubt that many problems that lead to the occurrence of waste are strongly related to 
the conceptual framework adopted in production management. However, very little, if 
any, studies have devoted attention to exploring performance-shaping mechanisms 
(i.e. systems and structural arrangements), as well as the context in which human 
actions take place and decisions are made regarding waste-minimisation strategising 
and implementation efforts.  
To say that waste is created due to human error is unhelpful; blame arguably fails 
to facilitate learning to ‘do better’ and similarly fails to lead us towards effective 
methods of reduction or prevention. As Dr Deming taught us: ‘94% of troubles and 
failures are attributed to the system (responsibility of management), 6% are due to 
special cases (such as human mistake)’ (Deming, 1984, p. 315). Human behaviour is 
always influenced by the environment in which it takes place (i.e. broader 
organisational system or institutional environment). Without a deep understanding of 
the economic, social and environmental issues contributing to poor decision-making, 
it is very likely that similar flawed or risky decisions will recur. For this reason, 
Levensen (2011) emphasises that: ‘Without changing the environment, human error 
cannot be reduced for long. We design systems in which human error is inevitable 
and then blame the human and not the system design' (p. 61). 
From this review of approaches to waste, as understood in Lean thinking, it is 
clear that it does not feature in modern construction economics or management 
theory. These approaches fail to recognise the imperfect systems in which entities not 
only operate inefficiently, but additionally protect themselves by adding contingency 
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and behaving opportunistically. The effect of these practices is to embed inefficient 
and wasteful processes across the supply chain and throughout the project life cycle. 
Consequently they have become part of the institution of the construction industry—
“the way it does business”.   
EXAMPLES OF IMPERFECT SYSTEMS AND STRUCTURES 
TRADITIONAL LUMP-SUM PROCUREMENT SYSTEMS BASED ON PRICE-COMPETITIVE 
TENDERING  
Traditional lump sum procurement methods are commonly used in the construction 
marketplace, even though they are associated with cost and design problems (Cheung 
and Yiu, 2006), cited in Love et al. (2011). It makes sense to say that lump sum 
procurement can encourage efficiency because it forces contractors to perform within 
agreed cost and time parameters. As such, this encourages them to be more efficient, 
which will hopefully allow them to increase their profit margins. Additionally, 
competition is generally seen as a means for driving out waste; it can for example 
force bidders to reduce or compromise their profit margin or risk allowance in bids 
(Laryea and Hughes, 2008).  
      On the other side, it can be strongly argued that under traditional lump sum 
competitive bidding methods, it is not unusual for contractors to bid low on a project 
with the intention to recover the loss (compromised profit) through either planned 
claims (Mohammad et al., 2011); or through pushing risk down the supply chain 
(Laryea and Hughes, 2008). Additionally, work by Love et al. (2009) revealed how 
late and low payments for design services, through competitive tendering based on 
lowest price, can encourage wasteful activities. For example, such practices often 
result in short cuts and the neglect of important design procedures, including design 
reviews and checks, as they are not typically specifically included in payments. In 
some circumstances, design companies may even have to re-use existing designs and 
specifications from previous projects in order to maximise fees and reduce design 
times. This type of practice can result in designs that are inappropriate for their 
intended purpose (Love et al, 2009). Moreover, they potentially include unnecessary 
and excessive amounts of resources in order to meet, and in so doing exceed, safety 
criteria through over engineering (Winch, 2000).  
UNFAIR CONTRACTS AND STRUCTURAL ARRANGEMENTS  
Certain types of contracts and structural arrangements that impose greater risks on 
one party over the other can also support waste. It is common practice for clients to 
exert most project risk, if not all, on contractors, in order to have more control whilst 
passing responsibility. Inequitable contractual risk allocation may, for example, 
encourage an opportunistic party to take advantage of the other party by transferring 
project risks (Osipova and Eriksson, 2011) or denying responsibility to avoid losses 
(Mitropoulos and Howell, 2001). Love et al. (2011) explain how a particular project 
was subject to disputes and a stressful working environment even though it was 
procured using an alliance contract. These problems were found to stem from the 
project team being constantly pressured by the client, in addition to designers, who 
were not subject to liquidated damages, deliberately adopting a practice of producing 
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design documents that were issued to contractors without conducting peer-reviewed 
checks in order to meet their deadlines.  
TRADITIONAL INSURANCE SYSTEMS  
It has been suggested by expert construction professionals that conventional 
arrangements for providing insurance cover add unnecessary costs to constructions 
projects, and can also obstruct collaboration between supply chains (Ndekugri et al. 
2013). This wasted cost, ultimately met by the client, arises through duplication in 
insurance cover as stakeholders’ policies overlap in the risks that they cover (Ibid.). 
Additionally, the practice of insuring the liabilities of individual project participants 
rather than the project risks themselves often leads to defensive attitudes between 
project participants, thereby hindering supply chain collaboration (Ibid.).  
TEXTUAL COMPLEXITY AND COMPREHENSIVENESS OF CONTRACT CONDITIONS AND 
STANDARD FORMS 
A contract demands commitments and procedures to be followed by contracting 
parties. According to Ting et al. (2007), information asymmetry and uncertainty 
induce the generation of entrepreneurs’ opportunism. Therefore, the clarity of 
contracts, in terms of readability and comprehensiveness, is essential for maintaining 
communication and commitment between project parties thereby leading to less time-
consuming and costly disputes (Rameezdeen and Rodrigo, 2013).  A study by 
Rameezdeen and Rodrigo (2013) verified that some contract conditions are very 
difficult to read, and require at least college level reading-skills to comprehend half of 
the clauses.  
In several case studies presented in Mitropoulos and Howell’s work (2001), 
contractors’ interpreted some construction contractual clauses differently, owing to 
their complexity, and this encouraged opportunistic behaviour, resulting in severe 
disputes. Similarly, complexity in insurance contracts, such as different policy 
wording and rights, issued by different insurers leads to unnecessary high transaction 
costs (Ndekugri et al., 2013). These interpretation difficulties and errors could be 
attributed to legalese and unnecessary formality in contract wordings. Therefore, it is 
important to emphasise here that lawyers and specialist surveyors are not the primary 
users of a contract; it is the project parties’ ability to capture their meaning which is 
fundamental for contract performance (Rameezdeen and Rodrigo, 2013). 
Having considered how imperfect systems and structures contribute to waste in 
construction. The focus now shifts to introduce institutional theory, which, in turn, 
provides the platform to explore neo-institutional theory in order to develop a more 
explicit theory of waste.  
BACKGROUND OF THE INSTITUTIONAL THEORY 
Institutional theory has a long and complex history dating back to the mid-nineteenth 
century and incorporates the pioneering insights of seminal scholars of the social 
sciences such as Max Webber (Scott, 2005). Old Institutional arguments relied on 
notions that ‘institutional contexts structure action’. According to Meyer (2008) 
‘Individuals were seen as creatures of habit groups as controlled by customs and 
societies as organized around culture’ (p. 790). Theories stretched from the economic 
to political and religious fields, emphasising more organisational or cultural forms of 
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control. However, in general, the nature of institutions and their forms of control over 
action were always subject to a lack of clarity and consensus in social scientific 
thinking (Meyer, 2008).  
The old institutionalism was encountered by constant debates about free will and 
determinism; as it saw humans, groups and organisations as naturally embedded 
entities in broad cultural and structural contexts. In brief, the old institutionalism was 
marginalised by the rise of the social sciences of modernity, where conceptions were 
built around notions of society being comprised of empowered, fairly rational, and 
rather free actors (Ibid.). These actors include individuals, governments, and the 
organisations created by people and governments. In addition, much of the work 
focused on institutionalism from these periods was subsumed in the storming 
advances of neoclassical theory in economics, behaviouralism in political science, 
and positivism in sociology. Further development by John Meyer and his colleagues 
at Stanford University led to a significant revival for the ideas of institutionalism 
from 1977 with the formulation of neo-institutional theory (Scott, 2005; 2008). 
NEO-INSTITUTIONAL THEORY   
Neo-institutional theory developed in response to specific processes and structures 
(i.e. causes of structural change in organisations) that were not adequately explained 
by prevailing rational-actor and contingency theories (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; 
Scott, 2005). For example, bureaucratic organisations continued to follow rules that in 
some cases conflicted with the organisations’ own goals (Mahalingam and Levitt, 
2007). The general argument advanced by the foundational work of Meyer and 
Rowan (1977) was that formal organisational structures reflected institutional forces 
instead of technological requirements and resource dependencies. They argued that 
many of the models giving rise to organisations are based on rationalised myths and 
rule-like frameworks that depend for their efficacy on imitation and the fact that they 
are widely shared and disseminated. 
At the time, when research efforts in the 1970s were focussed on understanding 
the reasons for variations amongst the kind (i.e. structural features) of organisations, 
seminal work by DiMaggio and Powell (1983) sought to explain homogeneity of 
organisations and practices rather than their variations. Their contention was that: 
‘Highly structured organisation fields provide a context in which individual efforts to 
deal rationally with uncertainty and constraint often lead, in the aggregate, to 
homogeneity in structure, culture, and output’ (p. 144).  
They described this phenomenon as institutional isomorphic change, which occurs 
through three mechanisms:  
(1) Coercive isomorphism that results from political forces and legitimacy issues;  
(2) Mimetic isomorphism occurring due to standard responses to uncertainty; and  
(3) Normative isomorphism associated with professionalisation. 
Organisational fields can be defined as those independent organisations that produce 
similar services or products and constitute a shared culture and social sub-system 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Scott; 2008). The logic for applying work at 
organisational field levels is that it provides us with a more systematic level of 
analysis; as attention is shifted from focussing merely on organisations in 
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environments to focussing on the organisation of the environment, with particular 
consideration to organisations as the key players of the field (Scott, 2008). 
Conventional neo-institutionalism literature, in replication of the old 
institutionalism, emphasised the ways by which institutions constrained and directed 
people (now perceived as bounded, purpose and empowered actors) to behave in 
certain regular, relatively rational, but homogeneous and expected ways (Meyer, 
2008; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). With more than 30 years of progress since the 
neo-institutional theory penetrated organisational sociology, the theory has been 
subject to various developments including reformulation of some of its arguments. In 
this paper, we will briefly highlight two main areas of development (for a fuller 
review, see Scott, 2008). 
TOWARDS A COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPTUAL SCHEMA 
Institutional theory has been widely employed among social, economic and political 
sciences to examine systems ranging from micro-interpersonal interactions to macro 
global frameworks. Despite the fact that the theory had multiple roots; there is a wide 
consensus that institutions matter (Peng et al., 2009). Nevertheless, social scholars in 
various ways were adopting the theory, and there seemed to be a crucial need to move 
from a looser to a tighter conceptualisation. For this reason, iconic sociologist W. 
Richard Scott provided a comprehensive conceptual schema (see Table 1) that guides 
directions for pursuing such a theory. Scott defined institutions as ‘regulative, 
normative, and cultural/cognitive systems and structures that, together with 
associated activities and resources, provide stability and meaning to social life’ 
(Scott, 2001, p. 48). His aim was not to provide a new integrated theory of 
institutions, but instead to better enable us to capture both the commonality and the 
diversity of past and present conceptions of institutional theory (Scott, 2008).  
Table 1: Scott’s Typology of Institutional Pillars and Carriers (Scott, 2001) 
Pillars 
Carriers Regulative Normative Cultural-Cognitive 
Symbolic Systems Rules, laws Values, expectations Categories, typifications, schema 
Relational Systems Governance & power systems 
Regimes, authority 
systems 
Structural isomorphism 
identities 
Routines Protocols, Standard Operating Procedures 
Jobs, roles, obedience 
to duty Scripts 
Artifacts Objects complying with mandated specifications 
Objects meeting 
conventions, standards 
Objects possessing 
symbolic value 
FROM DETERMINANT TOP-DOWN TO INTERACTIVE BOTTOM-UP PERSPECTIVES 
Institutional theory pays significant attention to the context. It considers the processes 
by which structures including rules, norms, and routines become established as 
authoritative guidelines for social behaviour.  Much of the early studies of 
institutional theory emphasised that organisations and actors, operating within a 
specific context, were pressurised to conform to the requirements and constraints of 
their institutional environment (e.g. DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Organisations’ 
self-interested rewards obtained from conformance to these institutional forces 
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include, for example, legitimacy, enhancing likelihood of survival, social support, 
stability, access to resources, acceptance in professions, and expedience to avoid 
questioning (Oliver, 1991). For these reasons, the prevalent language used was one of 
‘institutional effects’, thereby inferring a determinant ‘top-down’ argument (Scott, 
2005).   
     This unilateral perspective based on obedient organisations defocussed attentions 
of institutional scholars away from the fact that social structures are continuously 
modified by the individual and collective actions of social actors. Thus, according to 
Scott (2008), one of the important advances to the progress of institutional theory is 
the introduction of agented actors and accordingly the rise of interactive argument, 
which suggest that ‘institutional processes’ can operate in both ‘top-down’ and 
‘bottom up’ directions. This was important because it allows us to also identify the 
social actors who held the widely shared beliefs, or were enforcing taken for granted 
norms (Scott, 2005).  
     It was the seminal work of Oliver (1991) who affirmed the role of organisational 
self-interest and active agency within institutional contexts; by cleverly integrating 
resource-dependence predictions of organisational strategy with the more limited 
responses to institutional pressures that traditional institutional models provoked. She 
pointed out that although acquiescence to institutional processes is the most likely 
response by organisations and their leaders; strategic responses could range from 
passive to active resistance including: acquiescence; compromise; avoid; defy; and 
manipulate. Accordingly, organisational reactions to institutional pressure towards 
conformity will depend on five institutional antecedents (Table 2). 
Table 2: Antecedents of strategic responses (extracted from Oliver, 1991) 
Institutional 
Factor Research Question Predictive Dimension 
Cause Why is the organisation being pressurised to conform to institutional rules or expectations? 
Legitimacy or social fitness; 
Efficiency or economic fitness 
Constituents Who is asserting the institutional pressure on the organisation? 
Multiplicity of constituent 
demands; 
Dependency on institutional 
constituents 
Content To what norms or requirements is the organisation being pressurised to conform? 
Consistency with organisational 
goals; 
Discretionary constituents imposed 
on the organisation; 
Control How or by what means are the institutional pressures being exerted? 
Legal coercion or enforcement; 
Voluntary diffusion of norms; 
Context 
What is the environmental context within 
which institutional pressures are being 
exerted? 
Environmental uncertainty; 
Environmental interconnectedness 
INSTITUTIONAL WASTE WITHIN THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY 
Based on this study’s hypothesis—that there are institutional systems, structural 
arrangements and cognitive undergirding assumptions that support and encourage 
wasteful activities in construction—and building on the seminal studies of DiMaggio 
and Powell’s (1983) institutional isomorphism, Scott’s (2001) three pillars of 
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institutionalism, and Oliver’s (1991) topology of strategic responses; institutional 
waste is defined as:  
‘the regulative, normative, and cognitive-culture institutional processes which support 
and/or encourage wasteful activities, that the industry (organisation field) accedes to 
in the form of habitual, imitation or compliance; in order to achieve social legitimacy, 
survival and stability at the price of production efficiency and effectiveness’.  
     By habitual, here we mean: adhering to invisible, widely shared and taken for 
granted norms that have been historically repeated; by imitation: consciously or 
unconsciously mimicking what other more successful organisations do and strictly 
following imperfect advice from consulting firms and professional institutions; and 
by compliance: obeying imperfect institutional requirements. This could include 
imposing more control in contracts and structural arrangements, for example, as a 
response to problems of a lack of trust.  
     The study will adopt an ethnographic research approach for collecting data and 
providing empirical evidence. An exploratory and inductive-deductive (takes account 
of the hypotheses) case study will be conducted. Hence, perception, reflexivity and 
presence of the researcher are common critics associated with studies of this nature 
(Laryea, 2011). Focus groups will be utilised because they are ideally suited for the 
type of the study, as conversation is developed by group members and with minimal 
prompting from researchers. The focus groups will be structured in an approach 
similar to that adopted by Hughes et al. (2001), whose study aimed to develop 
mechanisms for measuring the true costs of tendering. The focus group transcripts 
will be analysed using ethnographic content analysis. This approach ensures that the 
information generated is not just a confirmation of the researchers’ preliminary 
perceptions, but instead allows concepts to emerge out of the research context 
(Hughes et al., 2001). To elaborate and demonstrate our definition within the context 
of construction, the following ‘tentative guiding hypotheses’ have been constructed.  
Hypothesis 1: The higher the degree of security, social legitimacy or stability, 
conceived by social actors, to be attainable from acquiescence to imperfect 
institutional pressure, the greater the likelihood of waste to be institutionalised within 
construction. An example of this could be the adherence of the construction industry 
to use short time-frame and price-competitive tendering processes, as a widely shared 
and taken for granted practice, despite it being associated with many flawed risk 
assumptions and criticised cost estimations (Laryea and Hughes, 2008; Laryea, 2011). 
Hypothesis 2: The higher the degree of dependency of social actors on the 
institutional construction environment, the more the likelihood of waste to be 
institutionalised. An example of this could be organisations which depend on 
obtaining their funding through bank loans, and as a result may pay more attention to 
their funders’ requirements rather than their customers’ needs (Chiang and Cheng, 
2010; Zimina and Pasquire, 2011b). This could also be associated with the way that 
clients’ advisors often set the ‘rules of the game’ (i.e. procurement type and 
construction periods stated in tenders) and then everyone else has to work within 
these rules, which could sometimes be dysfunctional. 
 
Hypothesis 3: The higher the degree of consistency of organisational goals and 
purposes with imperfect institutional pressures and norms, the greater the likelihood 
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of waste to be institutionalised within construction. For instance, it’s not unusual for 
construction organisations, because of competitive pressure, to rely on making their 
profits solely through commercial processes and manipulating roles with others, 
rather than struggling to improve production efficiency (Zimina and Pasquire, 2011b). 
As one of the interviewee’s in a study by Chiang and Cheng (2010) commented, 
contractors could only make profits, in this highly price-competitive industry, if they 
concentrated their efforts on three issues: (1) procurement of building materials; (2) 
cash flow management with their downstream supply chain; and (3) planning for and 
application of claims. 
Hypothesis 4: The higher the degree of voluntary diffusion of imperfect institutional 
practices, routines or norms, the greater the likelihood of waste to be institutionalised 
within construction. This is mainly associated with mimetic institutional waste. An 
example could be the imperfect norms, job duties and responsibilities diffused by 
professional institutions or trade associations, with which its members are requested 
to conform.  In such cases of very widely taken for granted understandings of what 
constitute genuine practices, it is highly likely that practitioners will conform because 
it does not occur to them to do otherwise (Oliver, 1991). Another example would 
include decision maker’s simply trying what others have found to work, for example 
traditional procurement or critical path planning – push system technique. 
Hypothesis 5: The higher the degree of environmental uncertainty, the greater the 
likelihood of waste to be institutionalised within construction. Environmental 
uncertainty in the construction industry can include, for example, fluctuations in the 
state of the economy comprised of factors such as inflation, changes to government 
macroeconomic policies and periods of instability of funding. Under such conditions, 
it is more likely for organisations to adhere to imperfect institutional regulations, 
norms and requirements imposed on them by governmental management, funders, 
professional association and public media pressure for the sake of survival, 
legitimacy, and protection from environmental turbulence (Oliver, 1991). 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This paper has exemplified various imperfect systems and structural arrangements 
that encourage and/or support wasteful activities in construction. Professionals and 
researchers are recommended to shift their attention from focussing merely on human 
behaviour and mistakes (silo thinking), to thinking systemically and structurally. It 
has also been demonstrated how neo-institutional theory - a branch of organisational 
sociology - has the potential to be used as an analytical lens to deliver a more explicit 
theory of waste, relating cause and effect within the wider aspects of construction 
systems and relationships. Finally, an outline of the concept of ‘institutional waste 
within construction’ is defined, and five tentative hypotheses are provided for future 
empirical examination.  
Further studies are recommended to adapt the institutional theory to capture the 
crucial institutional knowledge required to enable an understanding of why and how 
lean construction practices are more successful in some countries, for example the 
United States, than in other developed countries such as the United Kingdom (UK). 
An important point for future investigation is discussing whether there are evidences, 
from other sectors, that the focus on changes in the organizational context has been 
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effective for waste reduction. This study is part of an on-going PhD study at 
Nottingham Trent University, UK, which aims to define institutional waste within the 
construction industry. It is anticipated that the research project can lead to 
modifications in governmental policy, legalisation and future re-shaping of the roles 
and responsibilities of the professions and wider participants involved within the 
construction sector in order to increase the production efficiency and effectiveness of 
the industry. 
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